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Capital Markets Union: “Ever Closer Union” for the EU Financial System? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A period of stability might have been expected following the epochal crisis-era reforms 
to financial system governance in the EU. Instead, however, the EU is preoccupied with a 
new reform agenda – the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project. This article assesses 
whether the CMU project is likely to achieve the market transformation it seeks, how 
institutional factors are likely to shape the CMU project, and how it might change 
regulatory and supervisory governance for the EU financial system. It suggests that a 
complex feedback loop is likely to develop between single market and euro area interests 
with respect to CMU, and that the CMU project may consequently signal whether EU 
financial system governance is on a path to convergence or divergence. The CMU project 
may also reveal the extent of the impact of the European Council’s February 2016 New 
Settlement for the UK within the EU on EU financial governance.    
 
Keywords: Capital Markets Union; Banking Union; Financial Union; financial 
governance; securitization; Prospectus Directive; political economy; EU financial system; 
financial crisis; EU financial regulation; market finance 
     
 Introduction: why Consider Capital Markets Union? 
 
The New Reform Agenda 
After the behemoth regulatory, supervisory, and institutional financial-crisis-era reforms 
carried out over 2008-2014,
1
 and the radical Banking Union institutional reforms adopted 
over 2012-2014,
2
 a period of calm and reflection might have been predicted for EU 
                                                 
 
1
 For assessment see: D. Ioannou, B. Leblond, and A. Niemann, “European Integration and the Crisis: 
Practice and Theory” (2015) 22(2) Journal of European Public Policy 155; N. Moloney, EU Securities and 
Financial Markets Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2014); and E. Ferran, “Crisis-driven Regulatory 
Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going?” in E. Ferran, N. Moloney, J. Hill, and C. Coffee, The 
Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1-110. 
2
 Banking Union governance covers euro-area Member States (on a mandatory basis) and other 
“participating Member States” (on a voluntary basis). Within Banking Union, the harmonized pan-EU 
banking ‘single rule-book’ applies, but bank supervision and early intervention takes place within the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, and bank rescue and resolution operates within the Single Resolution 
Mechanism. From the burgeoning literature see: D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (eds), European Banking 
Union (Oxford University Press, 2015); K. Alexander, “A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism” (2015) 40 European Law Review 154; N. 
Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience” (2014) 51(6) Common Market 
Law Review 1609; and B. Wolfers and T. Vorland, “Level the Playing Field: the New Supervision of 
Credit Institutions by the European Central Bank” (2014) 51(5) Common Market Law Review 1463. 
financial system governance.
3
  But, and with some fanfare, the EU is now embroiled with 
the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project.  
 
The CMU reform agenda was launched by Commission President Juncker in October 
2014,
4
 given initial shape by the Commission’s February 2015 Green Paper,5 and 
articulated in the Commission’s September 2015 Action Plan.6 The CMU agenda is 
designed to “build a true single market for capital” and to “strengthen investment for the 
long term.”7 It reforms are organized around a number of related themes: the “path to 
growth” (early stage funding for start-ups and for small and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs) – this form of funding is often termed the “funding escalator”); facilitating 
company access to the public markets; investing for the long term and for infrastructure, 
and sustainable investment; fostering retail and institutional investment; leveraging 
banking capacity to support the economy; and facilitating cross-border investing.  The 
CMU agenda has four objectives: to unlock more investment from the EU and the rest of 
the world; to better connect financing to investment projects across the EU; to make the 
                                                 
3
 EU financial system governance is characterized here as the rules, supervisory arrangements, and 
institutional structures which support the single EU financial system (primarily, for the purposes of this 
discussion, the EU banking and capital markets). 
4
 A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political 
Guidelines for the next European Commission, 22 October 2014.  
5
 Commission, Green Paper. Building a Capital Markets Union COM (2015) 63 final.  
6
 Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union COM (2015) 468 final. 
7
 Commission CMU Green Paper, p. 2.  
financial system more stable; and to deepen financial integration and increase 
competition.
8
  
 
The main pillars of the CMU agenda thus far are the proposed reforms to the harmonized 
EU prospectus regime which governs access to the capital markets by companies (a 
proposal was presented in November 2015
9
); and the proposed harmonized EU regime 
for securitizations,
10
 which includes a specific regime for “standard, transparent, and 
simple” securitizations11 (political agreement on the securitization regime was reached by 
the ECOFIN Council in December 2015). The prospectus reform re-orders the current 
                                                 
8
 Commission CMU Action Plan, p.3.  
9
 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading COM (2015) 583 final. 
10
 Securitization refers to the process whereby loan assets (such as mortgages and loans to SMEs) are 
pooled together and moved from the balance sheet of a bank. This is achieved by means of structures which 
issue securities which generate returns from the underlying/repackaged loan assets according to the 
particular risk/return profile of the securities; these securities are typically marketed to institutional 
investors. Risk is accordingly diffused across market actors, loan assets are removed from bank balance 
sheets, and bank balance sheets can accordingly sustain more lending activity.  
11
 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms COM 
(2015) 473 final; and Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down common rules on securitization and creating a European framework for simple, 
transparent and standardized securitization COM (2015) 472) final. The proposed regime draws on 
Commission, An EU Framework for Simple, Transparent, and Standardized Securitization (2015). Related 
amendments have also been made to the Solvency II regime (C(2015) 6588/2). 
Prospectus Directive
12
 into a Regulation and proposes a series of largely deregulatory 
reforms designed to facilitate capital-raising, particularly by smaller companies. The 
securitization reforms are designed to stream-line the current patchwork of rules which 
apply to securitizations (notably with respect to due diligence, risk retention, and 
transparency requirements); to make the capital treatment of securitizations more risk 
sensitive; and to introduce a new harmonized regime for the identification and 
regulation/supervision of “standard, transparent, and simple” securitizations (including a 
more risk-sensitive capital treatment) which is designed to promote such securitizations 
and thereby to increase bank lending capacity. Specific reforms are also underway with 
respect to covered bonds
13
 and to the harmonized European Venture Capital Fund 
(EUVECA) and European Social Entrepreneurship Fund (EUSEF) regimes.
14
 
 
These specific initiatives are accompanied by a diffuse and often vague series of long-
term reform ambitions relating to: the facilitation of SME access to finance, including 
through reform of financial reporting requirements for SMEs, enhancement of data 
sources on SME credit status, and support of a pan-EU private placement funding market 
which facilitates direct investment in SMEs; the support of corporate bond markets; the 
enhancement of alternative means of financing, including crowdfunding; the 
                                                 
12
 Directive 2003/71/EC [2003] OJ L345/64.  
13
Commission, Consultation Document. Covered Bonds in the European Union (2015).   
14
 Regulation 345/2013 [2013] OJ L115/1 and Regulation 346/2013 [2013] OJ L115/18.  The Commission 
has consulted on the reforms needed to strengthen the capacity of these funds to support fund raising: 
Commission, Consultation Document. Review of the European Venture Capital Funds and European Social 
Entrepreneurship Funds Regulations (2015). 
development and diversification of the supply of funding, including through reforms to 
the EU’s harmonized fund management regulation regimes, notably the 2015 European 
Long Term Investment Fund structure (the ELTIF);
15
 the encouragement of stronger 
household/retail investment in the financial markets (a Green Paper on Retail Financial 
Services has been issued
16
); and the improvement of market effectiveness, including by 
means of enhancements to current EU supervisory arrangements, improvements to 
market data consolidation mechanisms, reforms to EU market infrastructure and 
securities law, and reforms to company law, corporate governance requirements, 
insolvency law, and taxation.
17
    
 
The CMU agenda is something of a hodge-podge of the mundane and the aspirational, 
the specific and the general, the short term and the long term. But its ambition is 
transformative. Its seeks to strengthen the fund-raising capacity of the single EU capital 
market; to increase and diversify of sources of funding in the EU beyond the currently 
dominant bank funding channel; and to achieve a more efficient and effective EU capital 
market.  
 
A Pivotal Moment for EU Financial System Governance? 
Why is yet another EU financial system governance reform agenda worthy of comment? 
Unsurprisingly given its promise of some deregulation and of regulatory intervention 
                                                 
15
 Regulation 2015/760 [2015] OJ L123/98.  
16
 Commission, Green Paper on Retail Financial Services COM (2015) 630 final. 
17
 Commission CMU Action Plan, pp. 7-27.  
targeted to facilitating funding (notably the securitization reforms), and its focus on 
markets as productive drivers of growth, CMU has had powerful traction with a battle-
weary and beleaguered financial industry.
18
 Although a Commission initiative, it has also 
garnered significant institutional support,
19
 including from the important summer 2015 
“Five Presidents’ Report” on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).20 It has also 
enjoyed political backing, notably in the UK
21
 which stands to benefit from the reforms 
given the pivotal position of the City of London in the EU capital market.  
 
But to what extent does the CMU project represent a potentially innovative or disruptive 
change to EU financial system governance? As considered further below, the CMU 
project can be regarded as simply another incremental step along an EU reform path 
                                                 
18
 Major supportive reviews include European IPO Task Force, Rebuilding IPOs in Europe. Creating Jobs 
and Growth in European Capital Markets (2015). Some 306 industry respondents relied to the initial Green 
Paper consultation; overall, responses were described by the Commission as “universally supportive” 
(Commission CMU Action Plan, p. 4).  
19
 The ECOFIN Council (Conclusions on the Commission Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets 
Union, Press Release 79/15, 10 November 2015), European Parliament (Resolution on Building a Capital 
Markets Union, B8-0655/2015, 1 July 2015), and ECB (Building a Capital Markets Union – Eurosystem 
Contribution to the European Commission’s Green Paper (2015)) are broadly supportive.  
20
 Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Report by Jean-Claude Juncker, in close 
cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi, and Martin Schulz (2015), p. 12.  
21
 See e.g. House of Lords, European Union Committee, 11
th
 Report of Session 2014-2015, Capital Markets 
Union: a welcome start (2015). 
which was originally laid out in 1966 with the Segré Report on capital market funding.
22
 
But the CMU agenda is more important to EU financial system governance than its 
incremental character and its relatively thin current content might suggest. It may have 
importance implications for the future organization of EU financial system governance 
and whether it becomes more centralized or fragmented; the evolution of institutional 
governance; the evolution of regulatory governance, particularly with respect to 
regulatory innovation; and the structure of the EU funding market. 
 
First, the CMU agenda and its execution is likely to shed light on the extent to which EU 
financial system governance is on a path towards multi-speed organization or, 
alternatively, towards cohesion, and on the related political dynamics.
23
 The crisis era led 
to the single EU financial system being governed by a harmonized “single rule-book” of 
massive scale and depth and being supported by a new institutional structure in the form 
of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
24
  But the crisis era also 
                                                 
22
 Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the EEC Commission, The Development of a European 
Capital Market (1966).   
23
 For a recent assessment of the impact of political interests on financial governance see F. Partnoy,  
“Financial Systems, Crises, and Regulation” in N. Moloney, E. Ferran, and J. Payne, (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Financial Regulation  (Oxford University Press, 2015),  pp. 68 - 93. 
24
 The ESFS is composed of: the Member States’ national supervisors which provide the foundations of the 
system; the three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities - the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and their co-ordinating Joint Committee; and the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), which is charged with monitoring pan-EU system-wide risks and macro-prudential 
stability.  
opened up the first major breach in the single financial system in the form of Banking 
Union. The supervision and rescue/resolution of Banking Union’s banks now takes place 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism; outside 
Banking Union, these functions are held at national level, albeit coordinated within the 
ESFS. This breach may be widened, with existential implications for the single financial 
system, by the CMU project, particularly if the CMU project becomes accelerated by or 
enmeshed within a related, euro-area-located “Financial Union.”  
 
Unlike Banking Union which is primarily a euro-area project (it is mandatory for euro-
area Member States although other “participating Member States” may join), CMU is a 
single market project. The CMU agenda is, in part, designed to protect the single market 
against both the centralizing centripetal forces and the countervailing and fragmenting 
centrifugal forces which may be unleashed by the euro-area Banking Union. But, and in a 
revealing indication of how these effects might develop, the June 2015 Five President’s 
Report on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) makes clear that CMU could have 
strong centralizing effects (and, at the same time, fragmenting effects) in that it could be 
co-opted by the euro area to form part of a new “Financial Union” - composed of 
Banking Union and CMU – which is essential to complete EMU.  
 
The Five Presidents’ Report calls for an “Economic Union” and (in the more long-term) a 
“Fiscal Union” to complete EMU and sets out high-level reform proposals and time-lines 
in this regard. But it also calls for a “Financial Union” and highlights that “Economic and 
Financial Union are complementary and mutually reinforcing….Progress on these two 
fronts must be a top priority.”25 The nature of this Financial Union is currently opaque. 
Banking Union seems to be at its core. But Financial Union is also characterized by the 
Five Presidents’ Report as including the single-market-oriented CMU as a means for 
allowing it to “diversify risks across countries, so [Financial Union] can moderate the 
impact of cross-country shocks” and ensure that monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted across EMU.
26
 The ECOFIN Council has similarly suggested that the 
achievement of CMU is a priority for completing EMU.
27
   
 
Execution of the CMU agenda is accordingly likely to see a complex feedback loop 
develop with respect to EU financial system governance between the euro area (which 
has distinct interests, having committed to risk mutualization, burden-sharing, and 
centralized supervision through Banking Union and its institutional structures), and the 
single financial market (which is less centralized and where interests are more diffuse, 
and the legal infrastructure for which is primarily concerned with market liberalization 
and related supervisory coordination and which organizes supervision and 
resolution/rescue at national level, albeit coordinated through the network-based ESFS).
28
 
                                                 
25
 Five Presidents’ Report, p. 11. 
26
 Five Presidents’ Report, p. 11. 
27
 November 2015 Council Conclusions, para. 4.  
28
 On the changing and fragmenting political economy of EU financial governance see D. Howarth and L. 
Quaglia, “The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe”, Europa Working Paper No 
2015/03, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2630555 and D. Howarth and L. Quaglia, “Banking Union 
as Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks, and 
‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union” (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 103.  
The implications for the governance design of the single EU financial market and for the 
integrity of the single market may be significant. With respect to regulatory governance, 
there are already indications of a relatively strong euro-area institutional interest in more 
intense levels of harmonization across a wide field of CMU-related measures (including 
taxation, company, and insolvency law – all currently primarily a function of domestic 
law).
29
 Whether or not this institutional support reflects political support across the euro 
area is not clear: the extent of political support for further harmonization is likely to 
reflect myriad influences, including euro-area familiarity with the Banking Union 
structures and closer convergence between the financial systems of certain euro-area 
Member States, should this be achieved. Coalitions of euro-area Member States are likely 
to be unstable, however, forming and re-forming depending on the particular issues at 
stake. But there is at least the potential for a rift to open between the euro area and other 
Member States with respect to the appropriate level of CMU-led harmonization for the 
single market, the influence of the euro area on the design of CMU, and, ultimately, 
whether a more intense form of CMU regulatory governance should be constructed for a 
“Financial Union.”   
 
                                                 
29
 e.g. Five Presidents’ Report, p. 12 (calling for a wide range of reforms, including with respect to 
taxation), and Panel Remarks by Yves Mersch, Member of the ECB Executive Board, Eurofi Conference, 
10 September 2015. Similarly, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has suggested that specific 
provisions with respect to prudential regulation may be required for Banking Union Member States (as 
recognized by the February 2016 New Settlement): Letter from Bank of England Governor Carney to 
Treasury Select Committee Chair Tyrie, 7 March 2016, pp. 7-8. 
Assuming that on 23 June 2016 the UK decides to remain a member of the EU, any euro-
area/Financial-Union-inspired re-characterization of the CMU project would be shaped 
by the European Council’s 18-19 February 2016 Decision on a “New Settlement” for the 
UK within the EU. With respect to financial system governance, the New Settlement is 
primarily concerned with confirming the current allocation of competence with respect to 
financial stability matters and with reinforcing the primacy of national 
supervisors/Member States (outside Banking Union/the euro area) in this regard. But it 
has implications for the development of the CMU reform agenda.  
 
The New Settlement Decision includes principles governing “the effective management 
of the banking union” and “the consequences of further integration of the euro area.”30 
The New Settlement in this regard seeks to respond to UK calls (fueled in particular by 
Banking Union) for reforms to protect UK and single market interests against the risk of 
euro area/Banking Union caucusing,
31
 and to reflect, at the same time, the concern of the 
Commission and of euro-area Member States, notably France, that the UK not be 
permitted to avoid the single rule-book and thereby to protect its financial sector.
32
 The 
                                                 
30
 Decision of the Heads of State or Government Meeting Within the European Council, Concerning a New 
Settlement for the United Kingdom with the European Union, European Council Meeting, 18 and 19 
February 2016 EUCO 1/16 (Annex 1).  The relevant principles are set out in Section A, Economic 
Governance. The Decision takes effect only if the UK decides to remain a member of the EU. 
31
 The UK’s related renegotiation demands were set out in a Letter from UK Prime Minister Cameron to 
European Council Chair Tusk, 10 November 2015, p. 2. 
32
 France was reportedly against any concessions which would have conferred on the UK a de facto veto on 
financial regulation: e.g. J. Brunsden and A Barker, “Brexit deal: would City safeguards have stopped 
heavily hedged and carefully nuanced set of related principles, which are designed, inter 
alia, to be “an instrument for the interpretation of the Treaties,” in many respects re-state 
established principles, such as the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of currency.
33
 
The New Settlement Decision also, however, addresses current tensions with respect to 
control of financial-stability-related measures by highlighting and reinforcing the current 
position with respect to financial stability and supervisory governance: competence with 
respect to macro-prudential responsibilities, and the supervision and resolution of 
financial institutions and markets, is declared to lie at national level, for non-euro-area 
Member States.
34
 The Decision similarly seeks to address concerns that euro-
area/Banking Union caucusing could influence the single-market-wide single rule-book. 
In particular, it acknowledges some potential for differential application, by providing 
that the single rule-book, the monolithic nature of which has been something of an article 
of faith since the crisis era,  “may need to be conceived in a more uniform manner” by 
the ECB within Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism, by the Single 
Resolution Board within the Single Resolution Mechanism, or by “Union bodies 
exercising similar functions” (likely a reference to the European Supervisory Authorities) 
in relation to Banking Union banks.
35
 But while it reinforces (politically at least) the 
                                                                                                                                                 
bonus cap”, Financial Times 3 February 2016 and A. Barker and G. Parker, “Cameron ‘in good place’ for 
Brussels deal”, Financial Times, 18 February 2016. 
33
 European Council Decision, Section A Economic Governance, para. 1. The principle acknowledges, 
however, that differences of treatment are possible, although they must be based on “objective reasons.” 
34
 European Council Decision, Section A Economic Governance, para. 4. 
35
 European Council Decision, Section A Economic Governance, para. 2.  This provision is somewhat 
Delphic, particularly as the need for consistent pan-EU application of the single rule-book has been a 
distinct competence of non-euro-area Member States, and seeks to immunize the single 
rule-book from distinct euro area/Banking Union needs, the New Settlement Decision 
also signals that further integration of financial system governance, beyond Banking 
Union, may take place within EMU. The New Settlement Decision states that “further 
deepening” is needed to establish EMU, that the EU institutions and Member States are 
to “facilitate coexistence between different perspectives,” and that non-euro-area Member 
States are not to impede the implementation of legal acts “directly linked to the 
functioning of the euro area.”36 Assuming that a euro-area “Financial Union” can be 
regarded as being “directly linked” to EMU (the nature of the required linkage to EMU, 
which requirement re-appears across the relevant principles, is not specified), a multi-
speed CMU cannot accordingly be ruled out, politically at least.  
 
There are, however, braking factors which may act as frictions which obstruct CMU-
driven fragmentation of EU financial system governance. The principles set out in the 
New Settlement Decision provide that the integrity of the internal market must be 
respected and that legal acts “directly relating to the functioning of the euro area” (which 
might, depending on how the Financial Union aspiration develops, include some CMU-
related measures) must respect the internal market. In addition, a political brake has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
defining feature of political, institutional, and policy discourse since the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
This provision has, for example, been interpreted as implying that relevant single rule-book rules take the 
form of Directives for non-euro-area Member States (thus allowing these Member States to adopt higher 
standards where appropriate) and maximum harmonization Regulations for euro area/Banking Union 
Member States: Letter from Bank of England Governor Carney to Treasury Select Committee Chair Tyrie, 
7 March 2016, pp. 7-8.  
36
 European Council Decision, Section A Economic Governance, opening para. 2. 
made available which allows one or more Member States which do not participate in 
Banking Union to require further Council (and European Council) discussion on such 
euro-area related measures (the scope of the brake is not entirely clear).
37
 More generally, 
while the New Settlement Decision suggests that the single rule-book may be interpreted  
in a more uniform manner for Banking Union banks, its principles also reinforce the 
overall primacy of the internal market’s single rule-book, stating that EU credit 
institutions and financial institutions are subject to the single rule-book, and noting that 
the competence of non-euro area Member States with respect to financial stability 
measures is without prejudice to the development of the single rule-book.
38
  
 
It remains to be seen whether regulatory governance for CMU will take the form of the 
traditional, pan-EU single rule-book or will alternatively follow a more differentiated 
model with distinct euro area and non-euro-area components: political, institutional, and 
market conditions will be determinative. It is, however, clear from the New Settlement 
Decision that the potential for differentiated integration with respect to financial system 
governance is now accepted politically, and that a decision-making mechanism (in the 
form of the political brake for Member States not participating in Banking Union) will 
apply. Multi-speed approaches may also appear with respect to CMU supervisory 
governance, as is also implicit in the New Settlement’s affirmation of respective 
national/Banking Union competences with respect to financial stability. However it 
develops, the evolution of CMU will prove revealing as to the future direction of EU 
                                                 
37
 Draft Council Decision, annexed to Section A of the European Council Decision (Annex II). 
38
 European Council Decision, Section A Economic Governance, paras. 2 and 4. 
financial system governance – as well as of the impact of the February 2016 New 
Settlement. 
 
Second, the institutional governance implications of the CMU project for EU financial 
system governance, and for the ESFS in particular, may be significant.
39
 The three still-
youthful European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), constructed in the white heat of crisis 
over 2010-2011 and charged with an array of supervisory convergence, quasi-regulatory, 
and (limited) direct supervisory and enforcement functions within the ESFS, reached 
their fifth birthdays in January 2016. The recent 2013-2014 Commission ESA Review 
has not called for radical reforms.
40
 But the institutional structures of EU financial system 
governance have long been associated with dynamism and momentum
41
 and the ESAs 
form part of an increasingly dynamic and unstable institutional eco-system. In particular, 
the extent to which the Banking Union reforms, and notably the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism, will exert destructive forces (whether 
centripetal or centrifugal) on the single-market-wide ESFS is not clear. In this unstable 
environment the CMU agenda is likely to act as an additional and de-stabilizing agent of 
change. In particular, it has the potential to change the operating environment and 
                                                 
39
 See further N. Moloney, “Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a ‘Big 
Bang’?”  (2016) European Company and Financial Law Review, forthcoming. 
40
 Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities and the European System 
of Financial Supervision COM (2014) 509 final. A subsequent White Paper on reform is expected by June 
2016. 
41
 See further Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, Ch.  XI. 
incentives of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the ESA most 
engaged with CMU. 
 
Third, the CMU project may generate regulatory innovation.
42
 It can reasonably be 
suggested that future regulatory innovations in EU financial system governance will be 
independent of the CMU agenda and, in particular, a function of the upcoming review 
period over which the massive crisis-era single rule-book will be reviewed. EU financial 
system regulation has entered a critical phase during which close attention will be trained 
on the crisis-era reforms. Regulatory design flaws
43
 and application problems (including 
                                                 
42
 Regulatory innovation can be associated with three forms of change. These are: first-level changes to the 
settings of regulation – technical changes to rules and practices which do not change the regulatory status 
quo and which might not be associated with innovation, although the cumulative effect may be innovative; 
second-level changes to institutional structures and to the nature of intervention – changes to the mix of 
hard and soft law deployed by regulators, for example; and third-level changes to the cognitive or 
normative nature of regulation, leading to, for example, a resetting of the policy goals of regulation: J. 
Black, “What is Regulatory Innovation”  in J. Black, M. Lodge, and M. Thatcher (eds), Regulatory 
Innovation. A Comparative Analysis (Elgar, 2005), pp. 9-11.  Elements of all three forms of innovation can 
be found in the CMU agenda which is concerned with technical change (first order), with stronger reliance 
on non-regulatory instruments (second order), and with growth as a more prominent policy goal of EU 
financial regulation (third order). 
43
 Including with respect to the cornerstone Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36/EU [2013] OJ 
L176/338 (CRD IV) and Regulation 575/2013 [2013] OJ L176/1 (CRR) which accommodates significant 
national divergence from the new capital rules (Basel Committee, Regulatory Consistency Assessment 
Programme (RCAP), Assessment of Basel III Regulation – European Union, December 2014); and in 
relation to inconsistencies between key definitions across the crisis-era reforms: e.g., House of Lords, 
with respect to proportionate application
44
) are emerging. A major Commission review of 
the crisis-era reforms is underway,
45
 while the Commission has also begun the process of 
examining the real economy impact of the reform programme.
46
 The individual review 
clauses which mandate reviews of the key crisis-era measures are being activated.
47
 Close 
                                                                                                                                                 
European Union Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2014-2015, The Post-Crisis EU Regulatory 
Framework: do the pieces fit? (2015), pp. 52-54. 
44
 As revealed by the controversy which attended the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) adoption of 
Guidelines on the highly-contested CRD IV/CRR remuneration/bank bonus rules and the related sharp 
divergences across national bank supervisors as to whether a proportionate application of the rules implied 
the dis-application of the rules or simply their calibration: EBA, Consultation on Draft Guidelines on Sound 
Remuneration Policies (2015) (EBA/CP/2015)/03). The final Guidelines were adopted in December 2015 
(EBA/GL/2015/22), but the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority have 
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45
 Commission, Call for Evidence, EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services (2015).  
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 e.g. the Commission’s July 2015 consultation on the impact of the new prudential rules on bank-based 
funding: Commission, DG FISMA Consultation Paper on the Possible Impact of the CRR and CRD IV on 
Banking Financing of the Economy (2015). For an initial, more high-level general assessment see 
Commission, A Reformed Financial Sector for Europe COM (2014) 279 final and its accompanying Staff 
Working Document (Commission, Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda (2014) SWD 
(2014) 158).  
47
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institutional, political, and market attention to this review process can be predicted.
48
 Any 
future regulatory innovation in EU financial system governance might accordingly take 
the form of related calibrations to existing rules, such as proportionality-related reforms. 
They might also take the form of procedural/institutional reforms, such as mechanisms 
which support the finessing and correction of the single rule-book. Nonetheless, the CMU 
project represents the first major regulatory initiative for the EU financial system in the 
wake of the financial and euro-area crises. It may therefore generate distinct regulatory 
innovations. The CMU project is also likely to be revealing as to whether and how the 
EU’s approach to financial system intervention has changed after the crisis-era period of 
intense reform.  In particular, the CMU project is likely to reveal the extent of the EU’s 
regulatory capacity to recalibrate regulation, where necessary, to support growth – a 
difficult exercise.
49
 
 
Fourth and finally, the market prize may be significant. Reflecting a global concern with 
the productive capacity of the financial system,
50
 the CMU project is designed to “unlock 
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Langevoort and R. Thompson, “Publicness in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act” 
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50
 The institutions of global financial governance are concerned e.g. with how “simple” securitizations 
which support funding might be identified and supported: Basel Committee and IOSCO, Criteria for 
investment in Europe’s companies and infrastructure” by building a “true single market 
in capital.” 51  Ambitiously, this single market in capital should complement banks as the 
predominant source of funding in the EU; unlock more investment for all companies (but 
particularly SMEs) and for long-term infrastructure investments; attract more investment 
into the EU from the rest of the world; and make the EU financial system more stable by 
opening up a wider range of funding sources.
52
  
 
While there are indications of a return to financial stability,
53
 after some eight years of 
market convulsions and disruptive reforms the ability of the EU financial system to fund 
growth is fragile. The capacity of banks to lend into the real economy, and in particular to 
SMEs and to long-term infrastructure projects – on both of which economic growth 
depends
54
 – has been reduced, in part as a result of the tougher regulatory regime (and in 
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Partial and Fragile Recovery (2014), p. 6.  
particular capital and leverage rules) under which banks now operate.
55
 With respect to 
market-based funding, the ability of major proprietary traders (market makers) to support 
liquidity in securities (particularly more illiquid securities) and in the risk management 
products which support market-based funding has been reduced, in part because of more 
intensive capital and other risk management requirements; there are particular concerns 
as to the impact of the EU’s new market microstructure rules on bond market liquidity,56 
and the implications for capital market funding through the primary bond issuance 
markets. If capital market funding sources (including investment by wholesale investors 
and loan origination by investment funds) can, however, be strengthened, the capacity of 
the EU to fund growth may be significantly enhanced.
57
 The capital market funding gap 
with the US, for example, remains significant: medium-sized US companies receive five 
times more funding from capital market sources.
58
 Comparisons with the US must, of 
course, be made with caution given the different institutional structure of the US and EU 
economies. The EU economy also depends on a well-functioning banking system, as the 
European Parliament has been quick to underline.
59
 Nonetheless, greater diversification 
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of funding sources such that an optimal choice of funding channel is available, and that 
the current correlation between bank funding and the credit and economic cycle is 
weakened, should strengthen the funding capacity of the EU and its potential for growth.  
 
Situating CMU 
This article accordingly seeks to chart, critique, and contextualize the main features of 
CMU, given its importance to EU financial governance more generally. To do so, it 
draws on a composite literature.  
 
For much of its development the still relatively youthful scholarship on EU financial 
system regulation has been of either a legal or a functionalist “law and finance” 
orientation. Legal scholarship has critiqued, for example, who should be the rule-maker 
for the EU financial system, the role of harmonization, the nature of the constitutional 
constraints which apply, and the roles and powers of the administrative structures which 
support EU financial governance.
60
 Law and finance analyses have considered, for 
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example, whether EU intervention is likely to have effects on financial development.
61
 
The CMU agenda provides a rich case-study for analyses of this type as it prompts 
questions as to whether the proposed regulatory reforms, and the related levels and styles 
of EU intervention, are effective and can achieve their outcomes.  
 
In addition, the cognate comparative political economy literature sheds sharp light on the 
power dynamics and the institutional context of the CMU project, and thus sustains 
predictions of how the project is likely to develop. This literature charts the forces which 
shape the single EU financial system,
62
 including those forces which emanate from the 
underpinning institutional structures which shape national economies and the related 
sectoral interests. The impact of shifting political and sectoral industry interests has been 
closely examined
63
 (including with respect to the relative influence of bank- and market-
based funding models and of the mixed market-based banking model now increasingly 
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common
64
) along with, for example, the influence of supranational interests,
65
 including 
those of the EU’s networked-based regulators.66 Recent research has, for example, 
exposed why and how different coalitions of interests over the financial crisis determined 
the nature and intensity of EU financial system regulation and also shaped the EU’s 
ability to influence international financial governance.
67
 
 
Cognate social science literature additionally sheds light on the “regulatory capacity”68 of 
the EU to achieve CMU, particularly given the recent “agencification” of EU financial 
system governance through the ESAs and the related enhancement of the EU’s 
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administrative capacity.
69
 It also illuminates how the traditional governance tools which 
the EU has deployed in market construction might change over the CMU project. In 
particular, the “experimentalist governance” strand of regulatory governance theory has 
potentially powerful explanatory force with respect to the fluid and iterative means 
through which the EU might construct CMU.
70
  
 
Drawing on this mosaic of perspectives, this article considers whether the CMU project is 
likely to have an impact on the EU capital market. Given that the ability of the CMU 
project to achieve transformative effects may be limited, it then assesses how the risks 
flowing from the CMU project can be mitigated. The article finally examines how CMU 
is likely to change regulatory and supervisory governance and whether centrifugal 
fragmentation effects or centripetal cohesive effects might be generated by the CMU 
project. 
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Capital Markets Union in Context: Transformative Effects and the Role of EU 
Regulation 
 
Market Finance and the EU 
The CMU agenda is concerned with market-based finance. In broad terms, in economies 
based on market finance non-bank intermediaries (such as investment firms and asset 
managers) play a significant role in supporting the movement of capital from capital 
suppliers (including households) to capital seekers (companies) by, for example, 
intermediating between firms issuing securities and investors providing capital. In 
economies based on bank finance banks take deposits and make loans and so are the 
major channel for intermediation between capital suppliers and capital seekers by means 
of their maturity transformation function (or their provision of loan assets to capital 
seekers based on the deposit liabilities banks draw from capital suppliers).
71
 Mixed 
funding models, based on market-based funding by banks (including through the 
securitization of loan assets) are, however, a strong feature of a number of economies, 
including those of the UK and France in the EU.
72
  
 
EU funding channels are, and have long been, heavily bank-based. Loans (including 
inter-company and bank loans) represent some 29% of non-financial company (NFC) 
funds, for example, while corporate bonds represent only 4% or so. Similarly, NFCs 
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account for only 7.5% or so of total bonds outstanding in the EU while governments 
account for some 42.5%.
73
 While reliance on equity funding through shares listed on 
trading venues is stronger (16.2% of NFC funding),
74
 equity funding is primarily the 
province of large NFCs and is very difficult to raise by SMEs (as is bond funding), given 
in particular SMEs’ difficulty in signaling their quality as investments and as information 
sources on SMEs are limited and non-standardized.
75
 By way of contrast, and allowing 
for the dangers in comparing very different economies and markets, market-based 
funding is significantly stronger in the US, where the public equity market, for example, 
is almost double the size of the EU equity market (at 138% and 64.5% of GDP, 
respectively).
76
  
 
The degree to which an economy relies on bank or market-based funding can have 
significant implications,
77
 although the relative importance of the different funding 
models for economic development is contested.
78
 Very broadly, market finance (and 
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particularly equity-based finance) is associated with more flexible financing and with the 
support of innovation. Banks, by contrast, may have conservative lending policies and, as 
the financial crisis showed to crippling effect, bank finance is at risk of paralyzing credit 
squeezes, is closely correlated with the economic cycle (EU SMEs are accordingly 
acutely vulnerable to funding contractions
79
), and is vulnerable to systemic failures.
80
 The 
financial crisis also underlined, however, the stability risks which markets can generate, 
and how intense levels of market-based intermediation can create destructive levels of 
risk and lead to a proliferation of risk transmission channels which can destabilize the 
financial system. The recent focus by the IMF on the stability risks posed by market 
finance underscores the risks of market-based finance.
81
 But while the financial crisis led 
to some questioning of the efficacy and role of the public equity markets, in particular, it 
has not led to a retreat from policy support of the market finance model.
82
  
 
The CMU agenda does not seek to transform the EU economy into a market-funding 
based economy, reflecting the neutrality view of bank and market-based funding which 
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posits that both funding models can contribute in different ways according to the stage of 
development of an economy, and that model imbalances should be avoided.
83
 The CMU 
project is accordingly designed to address the economic risks which an over-dependence 
on bank funding can generate. It seeks to diversify funding sources, protect the EU 
economy against a contraction in bank funding, and strengthen the shock-absorbing 
capacity of the EU economy.
84
 The CMU agenda also seeks an integrated capital market 
which allows market-based funding to flow cross-border without obstructive regulatory 
or supervisory divergences and which strengthens the capacity of EU funding markets to 
deliver diversification to capital suppliers and to thereby reduce the cost of capital.
85
 The 
CMU agenda is clear-eyed as to the continued importance of bank funding to the EU 
economy,
86
 but calls for a rebalancing.   
 
CMU and Transformative Effects: Lessons from History 
Is the CMU agenda likely to achieve the transformative outcomes sought? History may 
have some lessons here. In some respects there is nothing new in the CMU agenda. It 
forms part of a reform pathway that stretches back to the path-breaking 1966 Segré 
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Report, which underlined that economic growth in Europe was dependent on the capital 
markets and called for intervention. From the early attempts in the late 1970s at detailed 
harmonization of the rules which govern the disclosures required when companies 
(issuers of securities) access the capital markets; to the 1985 White Paper era measures 
which bolted on mutual recognition devices to those detailed harmonization measures; to 
the major Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)-era (1999-2005) reforms which saw the 
EU adopt a new “passporting” regime governing capital-market funding and the related 
harmonized disclosures required of companies (based on the 2003 Prospectus Directive, 
the 2004 Transparency Directive, and the 2002 International Accounting Standards 
Regulation
87
); to the financial-crisis-era reforms which include measures designed to 
facilitate SMEs in accessing the capital markets
88
 – throughout, the EU has deployed 
regulatory harmonizing measures to facilitate market finance.
89
  
 
In 1995, before the FSAP reforms, the Commission reported on the “feasibility of the 
creation of a European Capital Market for smaller entrepreneurially managed growing 
companies.”90 Over the FSAP era, and in the context of the global dotcom equity market 
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collapse, the Commission asserted that “[t]he assessment that market-based financing 
heralds substantial benefits for European investors and issuers is not overturned by 
periodic bouts of volatility or occasional market corrections.”91 The Commission’s 2005 
White Paper on Financial Services, which marked the end of the reforming FSAP period, 
saw the Commission assert that “financial markets are pivotal for the functioning of 
modern economies” and that greater integration was associated with more efficient 
allocation of resources and long-term economic performance.
92
 Over the crisis-era (and in 
particular in the later stages), the role of capital markets in funding the real economy 
remained an acute Commission concern, clear from its 2013 Green Paper on Long Term 
Investment Funding.
93
 There is therefore a long history of policy support for market 
finance and for EU harmonized rules to be deployed as a means for promoting market 
finance in the EU.  
 
The CMU agenda similarly relies on regulatory governance reforms to promote market 
finance. But the CMU agenda is more extensive than previous market finance reform 
agendas. It reaches into, for example, fund structures, securitization mechanisms, and the 
capital and liquidity rules which shape the investment decisions of institutional investors. 
It also seems to demand significantly heavier lifting of regulatory and related measures 
than has been required by the political and policy apparatus up to now. The implicit 
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assumption underpinning the 2015 CMU Green Paper is that harmonized regulation can 
have transformative as opposed to simply facilitative effects. Although claims to modesty 
abound,
94
 the overall implication is clear: regulatory intervention is needed for the 
purpose of driving necessary market change and, in light of the continued contraction in 
bank lending capacity, has a degree of urgency.
95
  
 
Allowing for the wider reach of the CMU reforms as compared to earlier policy agendas, 
what lessons as to the likelihood of the CMU agenda achieving its market outcomes can 
be drawn from the long history of CMU-style reforms in the EU?  
 
The extent to which EU regulatory measures can be transformative of market finance 
rather than simply facilitative is still not clear after some fifty years of EU effort. In some 
respects, the EU’s faith in the power of harmonized rules and related single market access 
devices (such as the Prospectus Directive’s “prospectus passport”) to drive market 
outcomes may not be misplaced. The extensive law and finance scholarship suggests that 
there is a link of some kind between law and strong securities markets.
96
 And certainly, 
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market finance has strengthened in the EU over the major regulatory reform periods. 
Total EU stock market capitalization (a useful, if flawed, proxy for the strength of market 
funding) rose from 22% of GDP in 1992 to 65% in 2013.
97
 The decade prior to the 
financial crisis witnessed particularly strong growth,
98
 with levels of debt and equity 
issuance activity in the EU over this period outstripping US issuance activity.
99
 The 
Commission’s 2004 Financial Integration Monitor, for example, reported that market 
finance had gained in importance, although it also acknowledged that, overall, bank 
lending (at 109.6% of GDP) remained the predominant source of financing in the (then) 
EU-15 Member States.
100
 By 2007 the ECB’s Report on Financial Integration was 
reporting on a significant increase in market finance opportunities and on the continued 
development of corporate bond and equity markets.
101
 The Commission’s 2007 Financial 
Integration Monitor agreed, reporting strong growth in bond and equity capital markets, 
with the value of the EU bond market as a proportion of GDP, for example, increasing 
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from 183% in 2004 to 198% in 2007.
102
 EU stock market capitalization as a proportion of 
GDP also rose over 2004-2007,
103
 narrowing the still significant gap with the US.
104
  
 
Over the financial crisis, funding patterns changed again. EU initial public offer (IPO) 
equity markets experienced a significant contraction,
105
 but the bond markets, by contrast, 
performed more strongly over the crisis, with issuance levels increasing.
 106
 The relative 
predominance of market and bank finance continues to vary significantly across Member 
States.
107
 
 
But is regulatory intervention a key independent variable in the expansion and 
contraction of market finance in the EU? The pre-FSAP evidence underlines that recourse 
                                                 
102
 Commission, European Financial Integration Report 2007, p. 34. 
103
 It grew from 71.7% of EU GDP in 2004, to 74%, 92.2%, and 92% in 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively: 
World Bank Data, available through http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS. 
104
 In 2004, US stock market capitalization as a % of GDP was 128.6%. By 2007 it was 142.9%: World 
Bank Data, available through http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS. 
105
 As is charted across a series of reports over 2008-2014 including: the PWC IPO Watch Europe Surveys, 
the Commission’s annual European Financial Stability and Integration Reviews, and ESMA’s Trends, 
Risks, and Vulnerabilities Reports.  For a review of the data see Moloney, EU Securities and Financial 
Markets Regulation, pp. 185-192.  
106
   Commission, 2015 European Financial Stability and Integration Report, p. 21.  
107
 For a recent assessment see Commission, 2015 European Financial Stability and Integration Report, pp. 
51-101. Some 60% of all bond issuance, e.g., occurs in the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, while the 
extent to which household financial assets take forms other than deposits or currency varies significantly 
and reflects for the most part the financial development of the Member States.  
by companies to market finance was already intensifying in the absence of intensive EU 
regulation,
108
 while the 2009 CRA Report on the impact of the FSAP generally found that 
the FSAP issuer disclosure measures (such as the Prospectus Directive) had a “mixed 
impact” and did not have a clear effect on securities issuance or on admission to trading 
activity.
109
 The multiplicity of determinative factors associated with the pre-crisis 
intensification of recourse by NFCs to the markets include growth in the institutional 
investor community, the impact of the euro, innovation in financing techniques 
(particularly asset securitization); the establishment of new trading venues (particularly 
the “second-tier” venues which support SMEs and venture capital); technological 
innovation supporting stronger price formation; and favourable global macro-economic 
conditions.
110
 Conversely, the persistent dominance of bank lending over this period 
notwithstanding these influences can be related to a swathe of non-regulatory factors, 
including, in the pre-crisis period, the significantly greater engagement by banks with 
trading and in securitization activities, which facilitated bank lending.
111
 A range of non-
regulatory difficulties have also come to be associated with the sluggish equity markets in 
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the EU generally over the crisis era, and in the UK in particular.
112
 The dramatic change 
in macroeconomic and financial system conditions over the crisis-era and the related 
impact on market funding channels further underscores the importance of non-regulatory 
factors. The recent growth in bond market issuance, for example, can be associated with 
the continued contraction in bank lending, investors’ search-for-yield efforts in a low 
interest environment, and the low cost of issuing longer-term high-yield bonds. And aside 
from macroeconomic conditions, the extent to which different funding models become 
embedded in different Member States is shaped by a complex and interdependent range 
of other variables, political and sectoral.
113
  
 
The CMU agenda represents something of a break from earlier EU market finance efforts 
in that it extends beyond the demand-side/capital-seeker issuer disclosure and related 
trading venue measures previously associated with the EU’s promotion of market 
finance. It takes a more holistic approach which pulls together a range of different 
regulatory techniques, ranging from support of the market infrastructures which facilitate 
trading to regulatory incentives for capital suppliers.
114
 But ultimately the empirical 
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evidence from the EU experience warns that the role of law in shaping different varieties 
of finance is contested and is likely limited.  
 
The picture is no less complex with respect to cross-border market finance. Over the 
FSAP period, evidence of integration in the form of pan-EU capital-raising by 
companies, stronger portfolio diversification by investors, a loosening of the entrenched 
“home bias,” and a narrowing of price dispersion in asset classes115  began to emerge.116 
In 2009, before the effects of the crisis had taken root, the Commission could report on a 
“remarkable” degree of integration in EU wholesale bond markets, as well as on good, if 
less intense, levels of integration in the equity markets.
117
 Over the financial crisis, 
however, significant retrenchment took place, with the ECB reporting on a “slow 
erosion” of progress towards integration, including in the previously highly-integrated 
bond markets.
118
 As has been repeatedly highlighted in CMU discussions, it became clear 
that cross-border bond markets were frothy and driven by wholesale transactions between 
financial institutions rather than by real economy funding transactions; once the crisis hit, 
this activity evaporated.
119
 Over 2013 and 2014, however, a reduction in EU bond market 
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fragmentation was reported.
120
 Equity market integration was less heavily impacted by 
the financial crisis; EU equity markets tend to display lower levels of cross-border price 
differentiation
121
 and relatively stable levels of cross-border investment, in particular by 
euro area investors.
122
 But pan-EU public offers remain rare. The extent to which 
harmonized EU rules have driven integration remains unclear given the range of factors 
which drive the timing and structure of offerings and cross-border investment patterns 
and incentives.  While, for example, the standardization of disclosure and financial 
reporting regimes facilitates cross-border funding, it is only one of a range of 
determinative factors.
123
   
 
Where does this experience leave the CMU project and its transformative effects? 
Certainly, it cautions against relying too heavily on reforms to the EU’s extensive and 
long-standing issuer disclosure and financial reporting regimes as means for driving 
change. The risks which the proposed reforms to the Prospectus Directive and to financial 
reporting may generate may accordingly be overly costly, as outlined in the next section.  
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Experience also cautions against over optimism as to the extent to which the more 
ambitious CMU regulatory reforms might drive change. The securitization reforms, 
which are directed to facilitating funding-oriented securitizations, and not to the highly 
complex and opaque securitizations associated with destructive risk transmission over the 
financial crisis, represent a new channel for the regulatory promotion of market finance 
by the EU. If a more facilitative regulatory regime can be designed for “simple, 
transparent, and standardized” securitizations, banks may have stronger incentives to 
securitize loan assets and thereby to free up their balance sheets for additional lending. 
Wholesale investors (the target of the reforms), benefiting from a more standardized 
regime with lower costs, may have stronger incentives to purchase these assets. A major 
obstacle to lending to SMEs could accordingly be removed if SME loan securitization is 
thereby strengthened. But even pre-crisis the SME securitization market was small, and it 
is not clear whether regulatory reform alone will support the generation of the €20 billion 
of additional funding which the Commission predicts.
124
 A host of challenges are 
associated with SME securitization, including with respect to poor and non-standardized 
credit data and to low yields on loan assets,
125
 which are not easily addressed by 
harmonized regulation. The extent to which securitizations can be standardized, and risks 
to investors more clearly signaled and/or reduced, in the absence of a harmonized, or part 
harmonized, EU insolvency law, is also not clear. 
 
                                                 
124
 Commission CMU Action Plan, p. 4. The ECB is also constructing a new database (“AnaCredit”) on 
corporate loans which is predicted to improve transparency on SME credit quality. 
125
 National Institute of Economic and Social Research (A. Armstrong and M.  Ebell), Research Report for 
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Efforts to apply lighter regulatory regimes to SMEs in order to ease their direct access to 
market-based funding may similarly prove to have little traction, given the limited 
recourse in practice by such firms to the markets and their dependence on bank lending.  
Potential direct SME investors also face significant difficulties. The patchy, limited, and 
non-standardized quality of credit data on SMEs, who do not report their financial 
information under the standardized International Financial Reporting Standards regime, 
remains a major obstacle to direct investment (and to related securitizations of SME loan 
assets). While efforts to improve access to SME credit data form part of the CMU 
agenda,
126
 progress is likely to be slow, and banks have few incentives to open up their 
generally well-developed SME credit databases to the market.  
 
Similarly, the EU investment funds market remains highly fragmented, which limits the 
potential for economies of scale and for risk management efficiencies, despite years of 
EU regulatory reform, notably under the “UCITS” funds regime. Recent efforts to 
strengthen the ability of funds to supply venture capital (notably through the 2013 
EUVECA fund structure) are already faltering,
127
 while the 2015 ELTIF fund structure 
for long term investment is also under early review.
128
 While regulatory enhancements 
can be made (particularly with respect to the current strict asset allocation limits imposed 
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on EUVECAs and ELTIFs and with respect to loan origination by funds
129
), it is not clear 
that the CMU project, through additional regulatory intervention, can significantly 
deepen and strengthen the fund investor base.  
 
The uncertainty extends beyond regulation to tax policy (assuming the EU could 
coordinate change in this area). For example, while a removal of the tax advantage 
enjoyed by debt over equity (interest payments on debt instruments are tax deductible) 
has been mooted as a means for driving stronger EU equity markets,
130
 the US tax rate 
applicable to equity is one of the highest although the US equity market is the world’s 
strongest.
131
  
 
The achievement of CMU is likely to depend on the smooth interaction of a host of 
moving parts. These include but are not limited to harmonized regulatory measures: the 
frictions generated by non-regulatory obstacles are considerable.
132
 Regulation may well 
have a facilitative function, but it is not clear that it will be transformative. Much depends 
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on the EU’s regulatory capacity to design reforms in such a way that the likelihood of 
optimal reforms is maximized and that regulatory design risks and unintended 
consequences are minimized, as discussed in the following section. 
 
CMU and EU Financial Market Regulation: A Test Case for the EU’s Post Crisis 
Regulatory Capacity 
 
Legislative and Administrative Challenges 
The many legacy effects of the financial crisis era on EU financial system governance 
include the EU’s significantly-enhanced regulatory capacity. Leaving to one side the 
inevitable bouts of political grandstanding over the crisis reform period and the related 
poor regulatory design outcomes,
133
 the co-legislators and the Commission have emerged 
from this period with, for the most part, enhanced reputations as experienced financial 
legislators.
134
 With respect to administrative rule-making, the technical capacity of the 
EU has been significantly strengthened by the ESAs, which support administrative rule-
making by the Commission by providing Technical Advice and by proposing Binding 
Technical Standards (a form of level 2 administrative rule).
135
 In principle, the EU should 
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be well-equipped to pursue the CMU agenda in an optimal manner and to manage its 
risks.  
 
These risks include, first, whether the EU can manage complex and competing 
objectives. Over the financial crisis, EU intervention was broadly directed to the support 
of financial stability and was framed by the G20’s reform agenda.  With the CMU 
agenda, EU intervention is displaying signs of “third order” regulatory innovation136 by 
becoming more strongly associated with the support of growth. This shift brings complex 
regulatory balancing challenges. There is, for example, a tension between the pursuit by 
the CMU agenda of stronger capital market funding, and the danger that stability risks are 
thereby increased.
137
 Independently of but almost contemporaneously with the 2015 
CMU Green Paper and subsequent Action Plan, the institutions of global financial 
governance have become increasingly concerned with the stability risks posed by capital 
markets and by market-based funding.
138
 The EU has, however, an enhanced institutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
Financial Supervision COM (2014) 509, final pp. 5-6; and IMF, Technical Note on ESMA, IMF Country 
Report No 13/69, pp. 22-23. 
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capacity post crisis for addressing design challenges of this nature. ESMA, for example, 
has been quick to reinforce the need to ensure investor protection and to promote stable 
markets as the CMU agenda progresses.
139
 It has also highlighted the capacity it brings to 
EU financial system governance with respect to risk assessment.
140
 The ECB, in its 
capacity as Banking Union’s powerful Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisor, has 
similarly underlined the need to monitor and manage the potential new risks to financial 
stability and is well-equipped to do so.
141
 The EU also has stronger administrative 
capacity, through ESMA in particular, to engage with the nascent international standard-
setting process on management of the risks of market-based funding (the international 
standard-setters are beginning to address the stability risks of capital markets and of 
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market-based funding
142
) and to calibrate EU regulatory and supervisory governance 
accordingly.
143
  
 
Second, a host of risks to rule-making quality arise from the “first-order” technical 
regulatory innovations which will follow under the CMU agenda. The CMU agenda 
generates, for example, the risk of spill-over and unintended effects from regulatory 
perimeter redesigns. To take one example, the “regulated market” regulatory perimeter144 
is one of the most important regulatory devices in EU capital market regulation for 
delineating the scope of regulation. Companies whose securities are admitted to trading 
on regulated markets are, under the single rule-book, subject to the most stringent levels 
of disclosure and distinct admission to trading requirements apply. Other trading venues 
(multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), often termed second tier or alternative venues) are 
subject to a lighter EU regime and are broadly self-regulating. This distinction reflects the 
well-established principle that trading venues should be empowered through the 
regulatory system to compete with respect to their different venue products and, 
accordingly, to provide specialized venues; these venues may offer lighter regulatory 
regimes for companies at an earlier stage of development but can also signal to investors 
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that risks can be higher. Companies can accordingly proceed through a “funding 
escalator” which conveys them from more lightly regulated venues with specialized 
investor interest to the heavily regulated and highly liquid “regulated markets” in which 
retail investors are often active and which act as price-setting venues for trading 
generally.
145
  
 
The CMU agenda may lead to the distinction between regulated markets and MTFs 
becoming blurred. The CMU Action Plan identifies MTFs as a vital element in the 
funding escalator for high-growth mid-sized companies and SMEs generally and calls for 
related regulatory costs to be reduced.
146
  The 2015 Prospectus Regulation Proposal, in an 
effort to reduce the costs borne by SMEs and to support the new MiFID II “SME Growth 
Market” MTF venue, proposes an optional new harmonized prospectus regime for SMEs 
seeking admission to MTFs (Prospectus Regulation Proposal, Article 15). A lighter and 
proportionate regime is envisaged, as are novel prospectus format techniques, such as the 
use of a “Q & A” document rather than the traditional prospectus.  But while a reform of 
this nature may ease costs for a limited number of smaller issuers,
147
 it could lead to 
unintended effects. The introduction of a new harmonized prospectus regime, even on an 
optional basis, could mean that MTF venues become less able to compete and to 
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specialize, and that the ability of such venues to experiment with and develop distinct 
prospectus rule-books is reduced. Investor confusion may also follow as the harmonized 
MTF prospectus will be different to the harmonized regulated market prospectus. The 
proposed reform also shows some mis-understanding of the dynamics of MTF venues. 
While EU-mandated prospectus requirements do not apply to such venues, the admission 
process and the due diligence performed by the professional investors active in such 
venues acts as a proxy for investor protection and as a substitute for the harmonized 
prospectus. Certainly, the principle of trading venue neutrality implied in the reform has 
some appeal and the proposed disclosure regime for MTFs will apply only to SMEs and 
on an optional basis. Nonetheless, careful consideration will be needed of the costs 
associated with reducing MTFs’ current discretion to compete on the basis of 
differentiated prospectus disclosure requirements, and with blurring the distinction 
between regulated markets and MTFs with respect to the admission of securities and 
disclosure.  
 
Similar risks are generated by the proposal in the 2015 Prospectus Regulation Proposal to 
introduce a new and lighter prospectus for secondary (subsequent) issuances of securities 
where a company has already admitted securities to a regulated market or to an MTF 
where the MTF takes the form of an SME Growth Market (Prospectus Regulation 
Proposal, Article 14). This reform similarly blurs the line between the mandatory 
regulated market prospectus and the non-harmonized admission documents required by 
MTFs. It allows companies admitted to either venue to benefit from a lighter prospectus, 
although the mandatory, harmonized prospectus applies only to regulated market 
admission.  The risks are all the greater as the EU’s regulatory capacity to manage 
changes to the legislative regime which can have spill-over and unintended effects is 
weak.
148
 
 
The risks of sub-optimal deregulation must also be managed. A degree of deregulation is 
to be expected after intense reform.
149
 The CMU agenda may, however, have accelerator 
effects, particularly with respect to SME regulation. In relation to prospectus reform, for 
example, the CMU Action Plan characterizes the mandatory (regulated market) 
prospectus required of companies seeking finance as a “gateway to public markets,” 
suggests that prospectuses are costly and onerous for SMEs to produce, and calls for a 
“genuinely proportionate” regime.150 The 2015 Prospectus Regulation Proposal proposes 
a host of deregulatory reforms for the regulated market prospectus, including raising the 
thresholds of offer size below which a prospectus is not required. There is a reasonable 
logic to many of the reforms. But the prospectus is an investor protection device as well 
as a fund-raising mechanism and has long been so characterized by EU financial 
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regulation and policy; production of a prospectus requires a company to engage in 
detailed due diligence and verification of its disclosures, gatekeepers such as underwriters 
and analysts review the prospectus, and liability mechanisms act as a deterrent to fraud. 
Any reform must accordingly not lose sight of the investor protection function. It also 
remains to be seen how well-equipped the legislative and administrative process is to 
manage what will likely be an industry clamour for deregulation. At the legislative level, 
both the Commission and the European Parliament appear committed to not disturbing 
the crisis-era rule-book without cause.
151
 The commitment under the CMU agenda to a 
“single rule-book” and to removing national options and derogations may also serve to 
reduce any undue industry pressure for deregulation. The ECB, which may come to play 
a significant role in shaping CMU if CMU and Financial Union become intertwined, has 
been robust in calling for consistent rule application and a single rule-book.
152
    
 
The CMU agenda is also likely to require a series of technical revisions to and 
enhancements of EU regulation.
153
 This is clear from, for example, the securitization 
reforms which seek to rationalize the current complex array of rules which applies to 
securitizations. To take another example, the need for deep market liquidity, particularly 
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in the bond markets, is a recurring theme of the CMU agenda.
154
 But the massive and 
novel MiFID II/MiFIR transparency regime for bond and derivatives markets, which will 
apply from 2018,
155
 is likely to have far-reaching and unforeseen effects on market 
liquidity across a range of asset classes, given the costs the regime is likely to impose on 
market-making activities, and the risk of a related contraction in liquidity for these asset 
classes. While ESMA has engaged in intense modeling, empirical review, and market 
consultation in developing the related new administrative rules,
156
 the effects of the new 
regime cannot be reliably quantified in advance. Calibration and correction may well be 
required.   
 
An Effective Legislative and Administrative Apparatus? 
It is not clear that the EU’s legislative and administrative apparatus is optimally equipped 
to deal with these different technical challenges. The co-legislators have shown 
themselves to be equipped to manage complex regulatory design questions,
157
 as is 
suggested by the speed with which ECOFIN Council came to agreement on the “simple, 
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 Of relevance to the CMU agenda in particular are the extensive revisions which the European 
Parliament’s ECON committee proposed to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in 
order to lighten the burden EMIR’s  risk management and hedging rules imposed on SMEs. 
transparent, and standardized”  securitization proposals,158 and to engineer novel fixes to 
seemingly intractable political obstacles.
159
 The co-legislators are also well supported by 
the ESAs, as is clear from the expertise the ESAs provided on how the EU might identify 
“simple, transparent, and standardized” securitizations and construct a related and 
calibrated regulatory regime.
160
 Recent indications that the European Parliament may not 
object to the ESAs having an advisory role during level 1 negotiations
161
 should further 
enhance the law-making process, including with respect to ESA understanding of any 
mandates for technical level 2 rule-making which may follow.  
 
But difficulties remain. For example, the legislative process still struggles to make an 
optimal distinction between legislative level 1 rules and administrative level 2 rules for 
the EU financial system. The encrustation of deep and often politically-motivated detail 
in many level 1 rules,
162
 and the removal thereby of the administrative process and its 
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 A classic case in point being the highly complex and technical exemption regime which applies to the 
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capacity for developing technically-secure and empirically-based detailed rules, can lead 
to sub-optimal legislation. It can also obstruct the ability to the ESAs to develop effective 
level 2 rules. The considerable experience the co-legislators now have with the 
administrative rule-making process and with the supporting role played by the ESAs, 
gained over the intense crisis-era reform period, suggests that the level 1 process should 
more easily focus on principles and on the construction of clear mandates for level 2 rule-
making. But there are countervailing factors. As the ESAs enhance their capacity and 
strengthen their institutional positions, the potential for institutional friction is likely to 
increase. For example, trust between the Parliament (careful to protect its prerogatives 
with respect to level 1 and also its constitutionally pre-eminent role as an over-seer (with 
the Council) of level 2) and the ESAs seems to be fragile. With respect to ESMA, the key 
ESA for CMU, there are some troubling signs of change to the generally strong 
ESMA/Parliament relationship which characterized ESMA’s first five years.163 While 
recent skirmishes
164
 may be unrepresentative,
165
 they may signal a growing lack of trust 
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Parliament’s willingness to delegate to level 2 over the CMU agenda and to adopt a more 
open-textured approach to level 1 legislation.
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Particular difficulties arise with respect to any CMU-required revisions to EU rules. 
Revisions to a level 1 legislative measure require the full co-legislation process and 
cannot easily be undertaken in a nimble manner. Revisions to administrative rules cannot 
be made by the technically-expert ESAs but must follow the relevant administrative rule-
making procedures which locate rule-making power with the Commission. The pivotal 
ESA/Commission relationship appears to be working well after some five years of 
experience. But the ability of the Commission to veto or revise Binding Technical 
Standards proposed by the ESAs or their Technical Advice can lead to delays and, 
potentially, institutional friction. The inability of the cumbersome legislative and 
administrative processes to deal speedily with technical revisions has been repeatedly 
highlighted by different crisis-era reviews.
167
 But the thicket of accountability and 
legitimacy difficulties and of constitutional conundrums (not least among them the need 
to ensure compliance with the Meroni prohibition on the exercise of widely-cast 
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discretionary powers by EU agencies
168
) surrounding any potential conferral of 
administrative rule-making power on the ESAs (or any construction of related remedial 
measures) means that solutions are not easy to design.  Some signs augur well. ESMA 
and the Commission recently agreed on an “early review” process which is designed to 
ensure that legal mandate and other difficulties which may obstruct the adoption by the 
Commission of an administrative rule proposed by ESMA are flagged early on.
169
 But 
however useful ad hoc solutions of this nature are, they do little to equip the EU with a 
stable and nimble means for correcting legislation and administrative rules. The EU also 
lacks an ability to suspend administrative rules quickly where necessary. The new MiFID 
II/MiFIR transparency rules, in particular, may require suspension if, as is possible, 
unforeseen and serious liquidity contractions, which disrupt the EU capital market, are 
generated. But an appropriately tailored procedure is not currently available under the 
administrative rule-making process.
170
 The incentives of the Commission (as the location 
of administrative rule-making power) and the European Parliament (with the Council, 
responsible for oversight of administrative rule-making) for experimenting with solutions 
are limited, however. 
 
Finally, it remains to be seen how the underlying political economy of EU financial 
governance will shape the CMU regulatory agenda. The financial crisis era has come to 
be associated with the dominance of “market-shaping” Member States, as opposed to the 
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“market-making” Member States.171 Although coalitions shifted and preferences changed 
across different proposals, the dominant influence on the post-crisis legislative regime 
has been the persistence of a coalition of market-shaping Member States which was often 
market-sceptical, suspicious of unbridled Anglo-American capitalism, and geared 
towards regulatory intervention.
172
 The CMU agenda, however, is an attractive one for 
Member States of a more liberal bent, in particular the UK. A greater degree of consensus 
can be expected as a result in ECOFIN Council negotiations, but clashes may arise where 
reforms have a deregulatory bent. The current difficult progress through the ECOFIN 
Council of the proposed Financial Transaction Tax under the Treaties’ “enhanced 
cooperation” provisions,173 and the challenge to its validity by the UK,174 is a reminder of 
the deep-rooted institutional differences which continue to shape Member State interests. 
If CMU becomes entangled with EMU and characterized as a means for achieving a 
Financial Union, political differences may become acute (see also the next section 
below).  The CMU agenda will also prove revealing as to the effectiveness of the post-
crisis relationship between the Commission, which is spearheading CMU, and the 
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European Parliament, particularly as the Parliament has emerged from the financial crisis 
with a significantly enhanced reputation and as the victor of some notable trilogue battles 
with the Commission and Council.  
 
In some respects the legislative and administrative processes are well-equipped to 
manage the CMU reform agenda. But the CMU project is likely to expose the persistent 
weaknesses in the EU’s legislative and administrative processes, while the underlying 
political economy of EU financial system governance may limit the extent to which 
CMU can deliver the outcomes it seeks. In particular, it is not clear that the heavy 
political and institutional lifting which is needed if the serious structural obstacles to 
CMU which derive from, for example, differing taxation requirements, insolvency rules, 
and the limited portability of national pensions, can be achieved. 
 
CMU and EU Financial System Governance: Centralization or Fragmentation?  
 
Regulatory Governance 
EU financial system governance has long been a laboratory for different styles of EU 
governance. In recent years it has been at the vanguard of the “agencification” of EU 
governance,
175
 and of the related if tentative adoption of more experimentalist and fluid 
styles of EU governance, as noted below. But a persistent feature of EU financial system 
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governance has been its heavy reliance on “command and control” regulatory governance 
in the form of legislation and administrative rules. EU financial system governance 
largely eschewed the move to “new governance” which characterized financial 
governance globally in the years prior to the financial crisis
176
  – albeit this was less a 
function of a lack of support for a more fluid approach to governance and more a function 
of the legal architecture required to support a cross-border financial system. The financial 
crisis has seen the entrenchment of traditional regulatory governance, reflecting the 
dictates of the G20 reform agenda and the host of political, institutional, and market 
incentives for adopting a single rule-book.  
 
The CMU project is unlikely to herald any radical changes to the current “command and 
control” style of regulatory governance currently dominant in the EU. CMU is a 
predominantly rules-based project - albeit one with some nuances, as noted ahead.
 
 It will 
also lead to a further intensification of regulatory governance, as is clear from the 
proposal to reshape the Prospectus Directive as a Regulation and thereby to remove 
Member State discretion. While there is a commitment to review the crisis-era rule-
book
177
 and to ensure it applies proportionately,
178
 there is little evidence of an 
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institutional or political appetite to shrink the single rule-book to a material extent. But 
the scope of regulatory governance under CMU may come to have distinct qualities, 
depending on the nature of the interaction between the CMU project and euro area 
financial governance. 
 
CMU-driven harmonization of regulatory governance is being associated with the 
reinforcement of the single market against the destabilizing effects - both centrifugal in 
the form of fragmentation effects and centripetal in the form of centralization effects - 
associated with Banking Union and the euro area. The successful action by the UK 
against the ECB’s clearing policy (which the UK claimed discriminated against non-
euro-area central clearing counterparties),
179
 and the declarations in the 2014 MiFID 
II/MiFIR that Member States not be discriminated against on currency grounds,
180
 are 
expressions of political and market anxieties in the UK as to the risks posed by euro area 
interests and related caucusing. So too is the July 2015 Joint Council and Commission 
Declaration, sought by the UK, that the European Financial Stability Mechanism cannot 
impose a liability on a non-euro-area Member State with respect to financial assistance to 
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a euro-area Member State.
181
 Related remedial measures formed a central element of the 
UK’s suite of renegotiation requests, agreement on which was reached through the 
February European Council New Settlement Decision,
182
 as outlined earlier in this article. 
In this febrile environment, CMU, as a single market project, provides an expedient 
political balm, with its single-market orientation being heralded as supportive of the 
single market more generally.
183
  
 
The principle of multi-speed financial system governance has, however, been established 
by Banking Union. The FTT negotiations taking place under “enhanced cooperation” 
further underline the potential for multi-speed financial governance. And, even allowing 
for a degree of institutional posturing, the statement by the ECB that, while “CMU is first 
and foremost an EU-28 agenda,” enhanced cooperation in other ways could be explored, 
and its support for a “vanguard group” of countries to proceed on the basis of “enhanced 
cooperation,” cannot be lightly dismissed.184 The co-opting by the June 2015 Five 
Presidents’ Report of CMU as a means for achieving Financial Union and for the 
completion of EMU further suggests that CMU may lead to further fragmentation 
between the single market and the euro area.  Most significantly, the adoption through the 
New Settlement Decision of principles governing euro area/non euro area interaction 
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with respect to financial system governance (including in relation to the differential 
application of the single rule-book to Banking Union banks), and of a political brake for 
related decision-making, as outlined above, has institutionalized multi-speed financial 
system governance within the EU. 
 
Accordingly, while the CMU project is likely to intensify EU regulatory governance, this 
intensification may take place to different extents and within different spheres. A 
Financial Union, with intense and wide harmonization of capital market regulation and 
designed to reinforce Economic, Monetary, and Fiscal Union, may come to operate 
across the euro area. Outside this Financial Union a less intense form of harmonization 
may be deployed to facilitate the single-market-wide CMU. The Banking Union/single 
market relationship provides an operational template for such multi-speed integration. 
The Banking Union template is, however, characterized by the mutualization of 
supervisory risk and the related centralization of supervision, rescue, and resolution 
structures. Regulatory governance, thus far, has operated on a single-market-wide basis.  
 
The sphere of application of CMU’s regulatory governance is accordingly difficult to 
predict. But it can be predicted that CMU-driven regulatory harmonization will be 
significant. If its ambitions are fulfilled, the CMU project will lead to the encroachment 
of harmonization in areas where a degree of Member State discretion, given differences 
in local market structures and legal regimes, has long been tolerated - these may include 
company law, corporate governance requirements, and insolvency law, although the 
political and legal obstacles, and the related potential for a CMU and Financial Union 
disjunction, should not be underestimated. Member State discretion is also likely to be 
restricted in other less combustible areas. The Commission has, for example, canvassed 
whether a distinct harmonized financial reporting regime for EU SMEs be developed
185
 – 
although the harmonized (IFRS-based) financial reporting regime currently applies only 
to the consolidated accounts of EU companies admitted to regulated markets (in practice, 
the largest companies); national reporting standards, attuned to local market, taxation, 
legal, and other features of domestic economies otherwise apply. This potential 
restriction of discretion is not unexpected, particularly in light of the crisis-era political 
and market support for the single rule-book. But the well-documented risks associated 
with the restriction of national discretion (relating to, for example, reduced ability to 
calibrate rules to local market structures, the loss of experimentation capacity, and the 
removal of incubators for local solutions which can shape EU intervention) arise.
186
  
 
There are countervailing factors which may lead to a degree of sustainable regulatory 
divergence. With the CMU agenda the EU appears to be embracing, to some extent, a 
more experimentalist form of regulatory governance. Experimentalist governance has 
been identified as being based on the setting of general framework goals (by, for 
example, the EU’s co-legislators, the Parliament and Council, through legislative rules) 
and on the related deployment - at lower levels of governance (such as industry 
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groupings) and with a degree of flexibility and discretion - of different forms of 
implementing rules, of monitoring devices, and of mechanisms for revising goals and 
rules.
187
 While the ESAs can be associated with experimentalist governance,
188
 the 
Commission last deployed industry-led soft Codes and Guidance in any significant way 
in 2006, with its encouragement to the EU rating agency industry to follow the 2004 
Code of Conduct adopted by the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions.
189
  
 
But a return to a more experimentalist form of engagement may be underway. The CMU 
Green Paper acknowledges that “legislation may not always be the appropriate policy 
response” and that the Commission will support market solutions where they are likely to 
be effective.
190
 Similarly, the ECOFIN Council has suggested that market-led initiatives 
and self regulation tools should be deployed where appropriate.
191
 The CMU private 
placement initiative, for example, is linked to the work of a consortium of industry bodies 
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who, following a mapping exercise by the Commission as to where the obstacles lie, have 
developed a market guide designed to support the development of a cross-border private 
placement market.
192
 The Commission has similarly queried whether the standardization 
measures which could strengthen EU bond markets and deepen their liquidity should be 
achieved through regulatory intervention or market-led initiatives.
193
 In another 
indication of a more flexible approach, the notion of opt-in harmonized regimes (“29th 
regimes”), bruited in the pre-crisis period but overtaken by the financial-crisis-era single 
rule-book reforms,
194
 has been canvassed, including for a new portable personal pension 
product;
195
 traces of this approach can also be seen in the 2015 Prospectus Regulation 
Proposal’s proposal for an optional prospectus regime for MTF venues. Offering as it 
does the potential for a degree of experimentation and revision, the adoption of a “29th 
regime” approach would reveal much as to whether experimentalist forms of governance 
are beginning to shape EU financial governance. Similarly, the Commission has decided 
to follow a “wait and see” approach in areas where the appropriate regulatory response is 
not yet clear. With respect to crowdfunding, for example, it has opted to assess national 
regimes and best practice and to monitor the development of crowdfunding channels 
before taking action.
196
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 Supervisory Governance 
Perhaps the most intriguing question relates to supervisory governance and to the likely 
impact of the CMU project on institutional governance structures.
197
 Will CMU follow 
the trajectory of Banking Union and lead to a greater centralization of capital markets 
supervision – even allowing for CMU and Banking Union being entirely different 
constructs?
198
  
 
Capital markets supervision in the EU remains largely decentralized and is located with 
Member States’ supervisors. Institutional support is provided by ESMA which carries out 
a range of supervisory coordination and convergence functions. ESMA also has a limited 
suite of direct supervisory powers. The minimal fiscal impact of particular financial 
market infrastructures and actors, combined with a supportive political and institutional 
climate over the financial crisis, led to ESMA being the sole ESA to be conferred with 
direct and exclusive supervisory powers over particular financial market participants 
(rating agencies and trade repositories for over-the-counter derivatives market data). 
Otherwise, and by contrast with Banking Union which is designed to mutualize risk and 
to support burden-sharing in order to ensure the stability of the euro-area banking system, 
fiscal neutrality remains the defining characteristic of EU-level supervisory governance 
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for the capital markets. Accordingly, supervision remains largely decentralized. 
Nonetheless, might the CMU agenda, in combination with the bedding in and 
normalization of the Banking Union structures, lead to spill-over effects which drive EU 
financial system governance towards the construction of a single capital markets 
supervisor – whether ESMA or another newly-minted institution?  
 
Whatever the functional risks and benefits of such a development, there are a host of 
legal frictions which caution against predictions of CMU-related change to the 
organization of capital market supervision in the EU.
199
 The constitutional obstacles 
alone are almost insurmountable. The Meroni doctrine, as recently interpreted by the 
CJEU with respect to EU financial system governance in the 2014 Short Selling ruling,
200
 
renders it legally very difficult for ESMA to be conferred with the wide range of 
discretionary supervisory powers which capital markets supervision would demand. 
ESMA’s current suite of limited direct supervisory powers is confined by legislative and 
administrative conditions which would be difficult to apply in any operationally sensible 
manner to a full-scale EU markets supervisor. While Article 127(6) TFEU could support 
the transfer of some capital market supervision powers to the ECB, which operates free 
of administrative agency restrictions, these powers could only relate to prudential 
supervision and not to conduct supervision which is the mainstay of capital markets 
supervision. And the UK’s declared opposition to any form of centralized capital market 
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supervision
201
 renders it politically highly unlikely that a new institution would be 
constructed under the Treaty’s residual competence which requires a unanimous Council 
vote (Article 352 TFEU).  Any such centralization would also require the mutualization 
of rescue and resolution risks and costs for a host of capital market actors to ensure that 
supervisory and rescue incentives were appropriately aligned. The immense 
constitutional difficulties which the construction of the Single Resolution Mechanism 
resolution fund provoked, including with respect to the Intergovernmental Agreement 
which governs the mutualization of national contributions within the resolution fund and 
which operates outside EU single market law, would pale in comparison with those 
which any attempt to construct a resolution fund for the potentially vast population of EU 
capital market actors would generate. The current slow progress towards a set of EU 
harmonized principles governing the resolution of systemically significant financial 
market infrastructures underlines the difficulties.
202
 The ECB’s recent controversial 
assertion that “the roadmap towards a genuine CMU….should thus include a single 
capital markets supervisor,”203 might accordingly be best characterized as a means for the 
ECB to claim ownership over any discussions, however tentative, to centralize 
supervision, and of it seeking to influence any such institutional change, rather than as a 
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real statement of intent.
204
 It may also indicate, however, that a euro-area Financial 
Union, with distinct supervisory and resolution structures to support capital market 
burden-sharing as well as distinct regulatory governance, is not to be confined to the 
realm of speculation.  
 
Greater centralization of supervision in the form of stronger supervisory convergence 
may, nonetheless, follow. Unable to adopt administrative rules, ESMA operates in the 
shadow of Commission hierarchy
205
 with respect to its quasi-regulatory activities. The 
potential for destabilizing and capacity-sapping tension with the Commission, while 
small, is real. Supervisory convergence and coordination activities, by contrast, allow 
ESMA to operate more freely and to strengthen thereby its hierarchical position over its 
constituent national supervisors (who form the membership of its decision-making Board 
of Supervisors). In addition, the establishment of the ECB within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism as the prudential supervisor for euro-area banks has made available 
significant capacity-strengthening opportunities for ESMA.
206
 ESMA is the natural 
institutional conduit through which national capital market supervisors can coordinate 
with the ECB, including on potential controversies relating to the often thin borderline 
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between prudential (ECB) and conduct (national supervisor) supervision. The arrival of 
Single Supervisory Mechanism has also generated significant incentives for ESMA not to 
lose ground to the ECB given the potential for spill-over effects from prudential bank 
supervision to shape its mandate and activities.  
 
Recent indications point to a strengthening ESMA ambition and capacity with respect to 
capital markets supervision. They also suggest that an intensification of ESMA’s 
supervisory activities will occur and will likely be accelerated by the CMU project. With 
respect to ECB relations, for example, while adopting a cooperative approach,
207
 ESMA 
seems to have sought to establish an institutional pre-eminence with respect to EU-level 
coordination on capital market supervision. It has, for example, rejected a request by the 
ECB for the ECB to exercise two votes on the multi-supervisor CCP (central clearing 
counterparty) colleges of supervisors which ESMA oversees, despite some resistance 
from the ECB.
208
 In addition, ESMA’s peer review powers over CCP colleges,209 which 
include oversight of likely controversial pan-EU stress tests and which ESMA is only 
beginning to test, are likely to further strengthen ESMA’s supervisory capacity.210 More 
generally, ESMA is adopting a more robust approach to peer review of its constituent 
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national supervisors
211
 and to its review powers more generally.  In an important 
development, January 2016 saw ESMA, for the first time, issue a negative opinion under 
the Short Selling Regulation 2012,
212
 in which it found emergency action by the Greek 
supervisor not to be appropriate or proportionate.
213
 A significant ESMA decision-
making capacity is, accordingly, becoming apparent, with the ESMA Board of 
Supervisors showing itself to have the capacity and the appetite to take robust action 
against its member supervisors where appropriate.  ESMA’s Strategic Orientation for 
2016-2020, which is designed to set a new course for ESMA after its initial (2011-2015) 
build-up phase and to re-tool it as the pressure of its quasi-regulatory work recedes, also 
suggest a strengthening of ESMA’s supervisory activities, including with respect to 
supervisory coordination and convergence, data collection, and market monitoring.
214
 
ESMA’s first work programme on supervisory convergence, published in early 2016, 
affirms this trend.
215
 
 
The CMU agenda offer further opportunities for ESMA to deploy its soft supervisory 
convergence and coordination powers more assertively, and to strengthen thereby its 
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institutional position within the ESFS with respect to capital markets supervision. ESMA 
has few incentives to claim additional direct supervisory powers, not least given the 
political sensitivities and the potential reputational risks attendant on its exercise of what 
must be constrained powers. But the CMU project’s concern to reduce the regulatory and 
supervisory frictions obstructing cross-border capital-raising and to increase supervisory 
convergence
216
 provides ESMA with an attractive opportunity to deploy its coordination 
powers in a capacity-strengthening manner.  ESMA initial response to the CMU agenda 
bears out this prediction. ESMA has used the CMU agenda to signal the importance of, 
and to consolidate, its supervisory convergence role,
217
 and to strengthen its currently 
shaky funding basis.
218
 ESMA has also underlined its ongoing efforts to strengthen its 
risk monitoring ability, and argued that it is best placed to ensure that appropriate and 
consistent implementation and supervisory outcomes are achieved for CMU.
219
 It has 
similarly highlighted the importance of its supervisory convergence activities to CMU, 
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including with respect to market surveillance, peer review, and the identification and 
exchange of good practices, and has identified a related set of principles and priorities.
220
   
ESMA has proved somewhat less enthusiastic with respect to direct supervision, 
reflecting the sensitivities, although it has suggested that it is “uniquely positioned to 
develop a European supervisory approach that could have strong benefits for pan-
European actors,” and affirmed that “while clearly not asking for new areas of 
supervision”, it “stands ready to assume such new tasks” should they be conferred.221   
Stronger supervisory convergence can accordingly be expected to follow given that 
ESMA has the necessary powers, incentives, and, increasingly, capacity to drive 
convergence and that CMU provides it with useful political and institutional cover.  
 
Conclusion 
Since 2008, the EU has been pre-occupied with a series of radical regulatory, 
supervisory, and institutional reforms to EU financial system governance, including the 
epochal Banking Union reforms. A period of reflection and stabilization might have been 
expected following the 2014 completion of the regulatory reform programme and the 
subsequent launch of Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism and Single 
Resolution Mechanism.  The CMU agenda, however, heralds a new period of instability 
for EU financial system governance.  
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Drawing on a mosaic of perspectives, this article considers the implications of CMU for 
EU financial system governance. It suggests that, while its content remains somewhat 
thin, the CMU agenda may have important implications for the EU financial system and 
its governance; it may also prove revealing as to the impact of the February 2016 
European Council Decision on a New Settlement for the UK within the EU.  In order to 
consider more closely the implications of CMU, the article considers whether CMU is 
likely to achieve the transformative market outcomes it seeks, the risks of CMU and 
whether the EU has the regulatory capacity to adopt an optimal set of rules, and the wider 
effects on regulatory and supervisory governance for the EU financial system.   
 
Whether or not, from a functional perspective, CMU can achieve the transformative 
effects it seeks in terms of the promotion of market finance is not clear given the 
experience with EU capital markets regulation to date. Accordingly, close attention must 
be given to the EU’s ability to produce rules which have the strongest likelihood of 
supporting efficient market-based funding and of managing the risks associated with 
regulatory change under the CMU agenda. The article identifies a series of regulatory 
risks associated with the CMU agenda and considers whether the regulatory capacity of 
the EU is equal to managing these risks and to adopting the types of reforms necessary to 
achieve CMU. It concludes that the picture is mixed. While in many respects the 
legislative and administrative processes are now well-equipped to manage a reform 
agenda of this nature, the CMU agenda is also likely to expose the persistent and serious 
weaknesses in the legislative and administrative processes, particularly with respect to the 
EU’s ability to finesse and calibrate rules.  
 The article also examines the wider effects of the CMU agenda on regulatory and 
supervisory governance for the EU financial system. With respect to regulatory 
governance, the single rule-book for the EU financial system is likely to widen and 
deepen and Member State discretion is likely to be further confined, although there are 
indications that a more experimentalist approach to governance may be deployed. But the 
complex interaction between the euro area interest in “completing EMU” and the single 
market interest in a facilitative CMU agenda makes it difficult to predict the scope of 
CMU-driven harmonization, particularly given the recent institutionalization of multi-
speed integration under the February 2016 European Council Decision on the New 
Settlement for the UK. Similarly, the impact on supervisory governance remains unclear. 
It can be predicted reasonably safely that the CMU project is unlikely to lead to a 
centralization of supervisory governance for the single capital market through a central 
supervisor, although an enhancement of supervisory coordination through ESMA is 
likely to follow. It is less easy to reject the prediction that a euro-area Financial Union 
could become entangled with the CMU project, and include centralized supervisory, 
rescue, and resolution structures.  
 
